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Flexible Nuclear Options: New Myths and Old Realities
I. INTRODUCTION
The new "great debate" on strategic deterrence that was 
anticipated a few years ago has quietly abated.The former 
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger's announcement of 
January 10, 1974, that "there has taken place a change in 
the strategies of the U.S. with regard to the hypothetical 
employment of central strategic forces" did elicit a flurry 
of writings denouncing the new strategy, but in very few cases 
the U.S. need for flexible nuclear options and the options' 
impact on deterrence were throughly examined. Meanwhile, 
first under Schlesinger and more recently under Secretary of 
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, the new posture has been adopted 
and weapons procurement for it is under way. One reason for 
the relative calm might be that as an issue strategic weapons 
have exhausted their appeal: the public has learned to live 
with the threat of nuclear annihilation, and arms control 
analysts perhaps feel that they have heard the same arguments 
once too often. Or it might be that security issues have been 
pushed to the background by other international concerns: 
detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and rapprochement 
between the U.S. and China have muted traditional debates over 
U.S. national security, and among international relations ex­
perts the sandbox of the strategist is being replaced by the 
pocket-calculator of the economist. It might also be that at 
least for the general public the arms debates are getting just
-2-
a little too complicated: it is relatively easy to take a 
stand on the ABM and one could have strong opinions about 
SALT, but what is one to think about the significance of the 
change from MIRV to MARV, or, as in the case to be examined 
here, from the doctrine of mutual assured destruction to 
flexible nuclear options?
Some analysts have argued that unconscious "forgetting 
about the unthinkable" might not be so harmful after all. 
If the public is no longer concerned about or frightened by 
CEPs or throw-weight gaps or counterforce targeting, this 
might make nuclear threats less potent and, consequently, 
nuclear weapons less important. It has been persuasively 
maintained that in the case of nuclear proliferation, a 
certain amount of public tedium with the issue has actually 
helped to dampen the interest of potential "nth countries"
3 to go nuclear. But this is unfortunately not the only 
possible consequence. With arms control analysts bored with 
the subject and the public indifferent or ignorant about the 
issues, a public debate on defense policies will be lacking, 
and the policies may become more irresponsible. At the very 
least, at stake are decisions on the direction of research 
and development and the quality and quantity of weapons; and 
on the perhaps more important level, the decisions will deter­
mine how the acquired weapons will be used if a war ever 
breaks out.
This paper argues that the case for flexible options 
should be carefully reassessed. The perceived need for options 
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grew out of disenchantments with the assured destruction 
doctrine. Criticisms of that doctrine were already spelled 
out in strategic debates in the beginning of the 1960's, but 
the growth of the Soviet strategic arsenal brought them new ur­
gency. The doctrine—an ability to absorb an opponent's 
massive nuclear strike and in a riposte to annihilate a cer­
tain percentage of his population and his industrial poten-
4 tial —was alleged to be incredible, irrational, and immoral. 
Incredible, because with the Soviet strategic arsenal capable 
of an assured retaliation the threat to inflict massive pun­
ishment on Soviet society for less than an all-out attack on 
American heartland is hardly believable; irrational, because 
it provides no answer to nuclear war breaking out by accident, 
miscalculation, or madness; and immoral, because against the 
time-honored principles of warfare, assured destruction deter­
rence stems from the threat to mass-slaughter civilian hostages.
To regain its credibility, Schlesinger argued, strategic 
deterrence "must rest on many options and on a spectrum of 
capabilities to support these options." He found it disturbing 
that in the face of provocations, either nuclear or non-nuclear, 
a U.S. President would be left with the choice of either strik­
ing massively or doing nothing. If, instead of having that 
stark choice, he could tailor the U.S. response to meet the 
aggression, deterrence would be enhanced. In terms of specific 
strategic targets this meant that in addition to Soviet cities 
and missile sites, the new targets would include 'point' tar­
gets that would damage the Soviet war-fighting capability— 
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such as airfields, submarine bases, dams, oil fields, and 
rail marshalling yards. It also meant that some character­
istics of the U.S. weapons systems had to be improved: only 
after revamping targeting plans, revising command and control 
procedures, and improving weapons, selective counterforce 
strikes could be dispensed.
These changes, according to Schlesinger, would reinforce 
deterrence in two ways. First, if the U.S. had the capability 
for flexible options, the possible enemy might be dissuaded 
from threatening or initiating aggression, since he could no 
longer act with impunity. Secondly, in a nuclear war—de­
terrence might still fail in spite of all precautions—damage 
could be limited if only relatively small strikes were ex­
changed. In sum, Schlesinger's proposal would provide U.S. 
decision-makers a chance for "a series of measured responses 
to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, 
have prospects of terminating hostilities before general war 
breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deter-
.,6rence.
Why should we be concerned about the Schlesinger doctrine? 
After all, his criticism of mutual assured destruction followed 
long-established arguments. Since the early 1960's the ethical 
dilemma of nuclear force has been frequently singled out, and 
the holding of innocent noncombatants as hostages has been ab-
7 
horred by several authors. Also, it has been argued that the 
credibility of deterrence has decreased, since the promise of 
a mutual suicide as a response to an opponent's minor probe 
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would probably be met with incredulity, and since uncertainties 
involved in conveying a deterrence commitment and calculating 
values the opponent puts on a disputed objective make it im­
possible to formulate anything but the crudest measure for
g
weighing different policy options. Neither was the proposal 
for the acquisition of a counterforce capability unprecedented. 
During the Eisenhower administration, the Air Force staunchly 
supported counterforce programs to supplement the massive 
retaliation doctrine, and ever since the McNamara initiative 
of June 1962 stating that for the United States "principal 
military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming 
from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction 
of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian popula-
9
tion," the concept of counterforce has been debated and 
redebated. The Nixon administration already early leaned 
toward flexible options.1^ In academic journals proposals 
for more flexibility and counterforce capabilities were put 
forward.11 In an eloquent appeal, Fred C. Ikle, Director of 
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, called for a 
strategy of threatening destruction to the "military, indus­
trial, and transportation assets—the sinews and muscles of
12the regime initiating war."
The central concern over the flexible options strategy 
does not arise from Schlesinger's criticism of the assured 
destruction doctrine, but rather from the fact that several 
crucial problems with the new policy were slighted. In the 
following pages, two of the problems will be examined. First, 
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it was asserted by Secretary Schlesinger that aside from 
improvements in targeting plans and command, control and 
communications procedures, few if any new weapons were 
needed to support the options. It will be argued here, 
however, that as a built-in feature of the strategy, pres­
sures for new weapons systems and qualitative improvements 
of the old ones will be increased, and that as a consequence, 
arms control problems will be further aggravated.
The second problem can be molded into a simple question: 
do flexible options strengthen deterrence? The fundamental 
assumption in this paper is that the rationale for any nu­
clear strategy and concomitant military posture must be 
deterrence. If flexible options enhance deterrence by making 
U.S. response credible in all possible contingencies—thus 
improving the deterrent value of an assured destruction pos­
ture—there is good reason to maintain that the strategy is 
desirable. If, on the other hand, they tend to undermine 
deterrence, the strategy should never become an official U.S. 
national policy. The main contention derived from the anal­
ysis of this paper is that flexible nuclear options fail to 
significantly improve the existing situation, and in fact at 
times might serve to erode deterrence.
II. FLEXIBLE OPTIONS AND ARMS CONTROL
After Schlesinger's initial announcement of the new 
strategy, much of the discussion was side-tracked on the 
question of whether or not the proposed changes were novel, 
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and the more urgent question of what impact flexible options 
were going to have on arms control received little attention. 
This emphasis reflected official pronouncements. Flexible 
options were heralded by Schlesinger as "probably the greatest
13 change in U.S. nuclear missile strategy in a decade." His 
initial remarks clearly indicated that in ordering strategic 
strikes the U.S. President had very little leeway. He al­
leged that the U.S. had targeted "Soviet cities initially 
and massively" and that this was "the principal option that 
the President of the United States or the National Command 
Authorities would have in the event of a possible recourse
14to strategic weapons." Critics of flexible options, on 
the other hand, contended that U.S. strategic forces have 
had a counterforce capability and targeting plans have been 
counterforce to some extent at least since the late 1950’s, 
and that only a small fraction of the targets contained in 
the strategic target plans are cities and other ’counter­
value' targets.15
Upon examination, it is evident that the United States 
had possessed a capability for counterforce options for a 
long time. This becomes obvious when we compare the number 
of relevant targets in the Soviet Union to the number of 
available U.S. warheads. The Soviet population is quite 
highly concentrated. Despite the enormous dimensions of 
the country, the majority of the population lives in less 
than a quarter of the country's total area. Of the Soviet urban 
population, which amounts to 56% of the total population, in
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1970 approximately 70% was located west of the Urals. What 
is even more significant, almost 85 million people, or about 
35% of the total Soviet population, resided in 310 cities of 
50,000 people or more. Furthermore, according to recent 
estimates, over 60% of Soviet industrial capacity is located
16in the top 300 cities. If our intention is primarily to 
inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet society—unac­
ceptable damage is the conventional measure for assured 
destruction and is calculated to be the destruction of be­
tween a quarter and a fifth of the Soviet population and 
between two-thirds and a half of the Soviet industrial ca-
17pacity —we can, therefore, confine ourselves to a rela­
tively limited set of targets. According to a widely 
accepted estimate, for "unacceptable damage" somewhere
18around 400 megaton-equivalents are needed. As early as 
in 1968, Secretary of Defense McNamara calculated that only 
either 440 Minuteman III ICBMs (1320 warheads) or 340 Poseidon 
SLBMs (3400 warheads) would be needed to inflict that amount 
of damage on Soviet society. In comparison, at the moment 
the United States is capable of launching roughly about 3600 
megaton-equivalents in the approximately 3000 warheads in
19its ICBM force and 4500 warheads in submarines. These fig­
ures still exclude more than 400 B-52 bombers capable of 
carrying several megaton-range warheads each, and medium­
range missiles and fighter bombers situated in aircraft 
carriers and overseas bases around the perimeter of the 
Soviet Union and its allies. Even these rough indicators 
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of U.S. strategic capability clearly demonstrate that a 
huge number of warheads and megatonnage is left over for 
counterforce targets after the force criteria for assured
20 destruction have been fulfilled.
Of course, targeting plans had always included military
21 targets. When testifying before Congress, Secretary 
Schlesinger himself modified his initial pronouncements 
and conceded that a massive countervalue attack was not 
the only option available. In his testimony he pointed 
out that "this [pure countervalue attacks] is not the way 
the forces were targeted, but the overt public doctrine
22 stressed only going against cities." On several occasions 
he stated that the strategic plans always included both 
several contingency options and military targets. For exam­
ple, in his FY 1975 Defense Report he emphasized that "sev­
eral targeting options, including military only and military 
plus urban/industrial variations, have been a part of U.S.
23 strategic doctrine for quite some time."
Was Schlesinger’s announcement then only designed to 
exaggerate the alleged inadequacies of the U.S. strategic 
weapons systems in order to sell the flexible options doctrine 
to the public? It seems indeed fair to assert that Schlesinger's 
initial remarks were meant to be alarmist, but the fact also 
remains that in real terms Schlesinger introduced some signif­
icant modifications. The main change took place in the Single 
Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) which is the master plan 
for U.S. nuclear weapons targeting. The new SIOP offers a 
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crucial degree of selectiveness and flexibility for a 
decision-maker. Under the old targeting plans dating
24from 1961-62, he had recourse to only a limited number 
of relatively large options. He could order a "withhold," 
i.e., he could keep a portion of the missiles from going 
against designated targets and reserve it for later use. 
However, the number of missiles in an attack tended to 
be large and contingency plans for withholds few. For 
example, in the late 1960’s as much as from two-thirds 
to three-quarters of the land-based ICBM force would be 
fired as a response to a crisis deemed by the top decision-
25 makers to warrant the use of nuclear weapons. Under the 
flexible response SIOP, the number of missiles used would 
be matched to the preceived needs of the situation, and 
depending on the exigencies of the situation, their number 
would range from as few as one or two to several thousand. 
Options would be "packaged" in anticipation of crises, and 
thus decision-making would be considerably faster and
26easier.
Another emphasis of the Schlesinger plans that differ­
entiates them from earlier ones is that now U.S. strategic 
forces are seen as an integral part of an interdependent 
triad of forces—conventional, theater nuclear, and stra­
tegic—and they are planned to be used to supplement the 
other two. In other words, strategic forces—especially 
the Minuteman III ICBM force, due to its favorable charac­
teristics from the point of view of command and control— 
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are now envisioned by U.S. strategic planners to perforin 
some of the tasks that were before assigned to tactical 
theater forces, e.g., to hit a military barrack or an air­
field in Eastern Europe or western Soviet Union, and they 
will be coordinated more closely than before with tactical
27and conventional military planning.
The crucial question now, from the point of view of 
arms control, is the following: can the missions designed 
for U.S. strategic forces in the revised targeting plan 
be performed with the existing arsenal of weapons or are 
new weapons systems needed? Secretary Schlesinger went 
to great pains to separate the issue of flexibility from 
that of "sizing." He emphatically argued that "the evolu­
tion in targeting doctrine is quite separable from, and
2 8 
need not affect the sizing of the strategic forces." In 
his testimony to Congress he pointed out that accuracy 
indeed contributes somewhat to the effectiveness of the 
new doctrine, but "we do not have to acquire a single addi-
2 9 tional weapon." He went on to claim that the only thing 
the U.S. needs is improved planning, which can be done 
with low cost, and improved command, control, and communi­
cations .
Regardless of Schlesinger's pronouncements to the 
contrary, a credible flexible options strategy does require, 
if not totally new weapons programs, at least considerable 
modifications and improvements of the old ones. In the 
Fiscal Year 1975 about $300 million was allocated for the 
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costs of the new targeting doctrine, of which amount roughly 
$100 million was used on improving command, control, and 
communications.Much of that sum was used for improving 
the capabilities of Minuteman III for retargeting. The 
new Command Data Buffer System (CDBS) will allow each of 
the Minuteman III missiles to be retargeted in some 36 
minutes (as compared to an earlier procedure of 16 to 24 
hours) and the entire Minuteman force in less than 10
31 hours. This improvement, along with better reconnaissance 
for post-attack mission assessment, enhances the possibil­
ities to "shoot-look-shoot"—to identify missiles that have 
failed in their mission and to reprogram other missiles 
to take their place—and hence improves flexibility of the 
Minuteman system.
Improved command, control, and communications systems 
by themselves can hardly be seen as anything else but com­
mendable. What should be a matter of concern, however, is 
the existence of parallel programs to upgrade accuracy and 
yields of U.S. weapons systems. To perform the tasks designed 
in the revised SIOP, missile warheads will have to be extreme­
ly accurate. The most accurate missile until now in American 
inventory has been Minuteman III, whose circular error prob­
able (CEP) is approximately 1300 feet. This accuracy is 
enough for large soft targets and gives the Minuteman warhead 
a fairly good silo killing capability, but it is too crude 
for the kinds of pinpoint attacks planned for in the new 
options. The U.S. is already pursuing a host of programs 
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to reduce missile CEP. Development of the Advanced Inertial 
Reference Sphere (AIRS) to reduce the cumulative navigational 
errors could improve the CEP of a Minuteman warhead to 700 
feet. With the introduction of terminal guidance systems 
and improved stellar navigation aids the CEP can be further 
reduced, to the point where CEPs of less than 100 feet are
.. n 32possible.
Concomitant with improvements in accuracy, there are 
programs under way for increasing hard target capabilities 
of the U.S. forces. In these programs, the greatest empha­
sis has been put on qualitative improvements of the ICBMs. 
The present MK 12 warhead fitted in Minuteman III missiles 
has proved to have only a limited capability against hardened 
military targets. Assuming perfect reliability, it is cal­
culated to have a less than 0.25 probability of kill against 
a silo hardened to 1000 psi, and against a 300 psi silo the 
probability increases only to 0.45. It is obvious that too 
many warheads would have to be expended for each silo to 
achieve a high probability of kill. That would be not only 
expensive, but the "fratricide effects" might make it hard
33 to destroy the silos. A new warhead, designated MK 12A, 
will be fitted in the Minuteman III missiles in the late 
1970's, and it will have a yield approximately twice that of 
the old Minuteman warhead of 170 KT. The significance of 
this improvement, coupled with the expected reductions in 
CEPs mentioned earlier, can be seen clearly if the kill 
probabilities of the current and projected Minuteman missiles 
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are compared: where the current warhead has a kill prob- 
ality of less than 0.25 against a 1000 psi silo, the MK 
12A warhead with improved accuracy is expected to have a
340.9 probability of knocking out a similar silo.
Several other programs are improving the ICBM capa­
bilities. Under the Upgraded Silo Program, silos are 
redesigned to survive blast overpressures and to resist 
the electromagnetic pulse created by nuclear explosions; 
"cold launching" the missiles will provide for an increase 
of about 15% in the usable diameter of a silo and make it 
possible to retrofit bigger launchers in the current
35silos. An especially interesting program is Project
Pave Pepper. In FY 1976 Defense Report Schlesinger de­
scribed the flight-testing of two Minuteman III missiles, each 
with several smaller re-entry vehicles which "would give 
the U.S. the option to expand the target coverage of the 
Minuteman force without any increase in the number of
3 6missiles deployed." The additional capacity of warheads 
would be useful in performing several of the flexible options* 
missions. They would serve "as a hedge against large 
losses in the Minuteman force, as a means of increasing 
our coverage of relatively soft-point targets of value 
that are not collocated with population, for suppression 
of expanded Soviet defenses, and as a hedge against unex-
37 pected failures in the bomber or SLBM forces." Finally, 
it should be emphasized that all these improvements have 
been launched under the protective umbrella of the SALT 
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agreementS; Since the SALT I agreement merely places numerical 
restrictions on the "legs" of the strategic Triad, and even 
if the Vladivostok agreements are formalized in a treaty, 
qualitative improvements can proceed unimpeded. The Vladivostok 
understandings only provide a ceiling of 2400 ICBMs, SLBMs and 
strategic bombers, of which a maximum of 1320 can be MIRVed, 
but make no attempt to check technological improvements on 
the existing weapons systems.
As we can see, the focus of arms control has shifted away 
from quantitative issues to the issues of technological refine­
ments: improvements in silo capabilities, innovations in
guidance technology, increases in the number of MIRVed war­
heads in a single missile. Under these circumstances, what 
are realistic prospects for qualitative arms limitations? 
First of all, a prospective arms control agreement will have 
to overcome a strong opposition formed by various bureaucratic 
and organizational interests. A possibility of exploiting 
novel technology will bring about a coalition of the military, 
scientists researching in weapons laboratories, and defense 
contractors. The military and the scientists, at minimum, 
want to protect their professional prerogatives by attempting 
to minimize the risk of being caught by surprise by Soviet 
developments in weapons technology. This has been clearly 
manifested in the case of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations.
In 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw it vital to their 
interests to specifically secure "the maintenance of modern 
nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical 
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and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, 
retain and insure the continued application of our human 
scientific resources to those programs on which continued
3 8 progress in nuclear technology depends" before they 
gave their consent to the Limited Test Ban Treaty; and 
in regard to the recent Threshold Test Ban Treaty, it 
has been pointedly argued that "under the 150 KT limit, 
the U.S. can still develop advanced penetrators as well 
as improved strategic and tactical warheads designed for
39lower collateral damage." Therefore, whether the 
coalition is glued together by the "sweetness" of new
40 41technology, the organizational health imperative, 
or the irresistible drive of bureaucratic process and
42procedures, the resulting alliance is a strong one, 
and qualitative arms control efforts will become exteme- 
ly complex and difficult. Furthermore, any agreement 
reached would pose almost insurmountable difficulties 
from the viewpoint of verification. A quantitative 
agreement like the SALT I is relatively simple to mon­
itor by sophisticated satellite reconnaissance, but a 
qualitative agreement would not lend itself to easy veri­
fication. Tracking down qualitative improvements in 
delivery vehicles and warheads would necessarily mean 
on-site inspection—and that is the requirement on which 
international agreements have traditionally foundered— 
but even close inspection might do little good: real 
operational capabilities of weapons systems could be 
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simply altered by substituting a more primitive version of 
a component for the inspectors and then replacing it with 
the more advanced technology when the inspectors are gone. 
Verification will, therefore, again emerge as a likely 
stumbling-block for any agreement attempting to stem quali­
tative improvements.
Aside from vested bureaucratic interests and verification 
problems, certain characteristic features of the new technolo-
43 gies will make the prospects for limitations especially dim. 
First, arms control advocates in Congress and in the public 
at large are confronted by weapons programs that are little 
publicized and relatively inexpensive. Public interest was 
aroused by programs like the ABM, B-l and Trident systems, 
for they were highly visible, completely new weapons, with 
costs soaring to billions of dollars. In contrast, AIRS, 
MK 12A, and Pave Pepper—while immensely important for the 
credibility of flexible options—are virtually unknown to 
the public, and burdened with only a fraction of the costs 
of the former systems. For example, for Fiscal Year 1977, 
Secretary Rumsfeld requested $472 million for all Minuteman 
improvement programs. Of that amount, the vast majority 
($367 million) was earmarked for the silo upgrade program, 
and only as little as $49 million and $37 million was re­
quested, respectively, for accuracy improvements and for the
44 development of the MK 12A warhead. In the case of Pave 
Pepper, the previously provided $18 million and the $2 million 
allocated in Fiscal Year 1976 were adequate to complete the 
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program. In comparison, a single B-l strategic bomber 
carries a price tag of $84 million, and a commonly quoted 
estimate for the research and development and the deploy­
ment of the first group of ten Trident submarines is $15
46 billion dollars. It is obvious from these figures that 
the new technologies cannot be curtailed by attacking the 
perennial wastefulness of the Pentagon, and it will be 
difficult for arms control advocates to garner enough 
support to stop such innocuous and inexpensive programs.
Secondly, the nature of technological innovation pro­
cess will make it progressively more difficult to halt 
arms procurement. Developing an operational technology 
is a long and arduous road, and weapons are produced only 
after a lengthy "incubation" period of research, design, 
and experiments. For example, recent studies on MIRV 
have demonstrated that the development of MIRV took a 
decade, and, perhaps even more interestingly, that it is 
impossible to determine the exact moment of MIRV's con­
ception. The actual deployment decision was just a 
culmination of a long process of technical possibilities, 
political choices, and alliances of organizational inter-
47 . .ests. In the case of improvements for flexible options, 
Schlesinger has aptly illustrated the difficulty of trying 
to pinpoint their origins. "There is no single point in 
time at which such a decision can be described as having 
taken place," was his reply to an inquiry on when the deci­
sion was made to improve the accuracy of U.S. strategic
48weapons.
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Finally, even if there were Congressional cutbacks on 
the funding of some of the programs, it would be hard to 
keep some crucial refinements like improvements in accuracy 
from being incorporated into the weapons systems. Often 
these improvements involve technologies that are direct 
spin-offs from civilian research: microelectronics, com­
puter technology, advanced measurement of the earth's 
gravitational field. Or at times military technologies 
might have useful civilian applications. For example, the 
same satellite navigation system that would guide a war­
head within 30 feet from its target, can be used to help
49 ships determine their location with the accuracy of 30 feet.
The military and civilian applications of advanced technology 
are, therefore, so intertwined that it would be a hopeless 
task to attempt to separate the two.
All this raises the inevitable question: was the flex­
ible options policy unavoidable and Schlesinger merely expe­
diting the obvious? As we have seen, a good case can be 
made for an affirmative answer. Advanced technologies were 
available and at least partly already creeping into programs, 
and especially after the Air Force and the Navy had started
50 to see eye to eye on the desirability of counterforce, 
pressures from bureaucracies were mounting. Yet, it would 
be a mistake to see Schlesinger as merely enmeshed in an 
irresistible web of technological imperatives and bureaucratic 
interests. All along he and the most influential members of 
the Nixon administration, including Kissinger and Nixon himself, 
-20-
supported the proponents of flexible options. He shared 
with them the fear that the Soviets with their new genera­
tion of more accurate ICBMs would threaten the U.S. land- 
based missiles. It was his conviction that the numerical 
inferiority in delivery vehicles after SALT I should be 
compensated by U.S. technological advantage, and that the 
advantage should be played to the hilt. Also, it was his 
concern that the Soviets might be tempted to wrest political 
concessions from the United States if the United States were 
not able to respond with strategic flexibility. It would 
probably be naive to maintain that had Schlesinger come out 
strongly against flexible options the genie could have been 
coaxed back into the bottle. The technologies would have 
probably found their way to weapons systems sooner or later. 
But had he done so, and used the prerogatives of his office— 
the stuff that bureaucratic politics is supposed to be made
52of —for a staunch support of the proponents of assured 
destruction, he would have kept the lid on Pandora’s box a 
little longer, and provided at least a chance for arms con­
trol measures.
In conclusion, flexible options policy gives a virtual 
carte blanche for qualitative weapons improvements, and makes
53arms control more and more difficult. The criteria for 
assured destruction at least provided some answers to the 
question of "how much is enough," but with flexible options 
policy, there is no logical point of halting weapons refine­
ments. Improved accuracies and yields are soon feared to 
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make land-based forces vulnerable. This is especially 
alarming for the Soviets, for in spite of their rapidly 
improving sea-based deterrent, most of their strategic 
forces are still land-based. A fear of first-strike 
might increase incentives to develop systems like the 
cruise missile and air or land-mobile ICBMs. What the 
new developments will be like, is still a matter of con­
jecture, but in any case, as a result of the adoption of 
flexible options strategy, there is pressure for more and 
more diversified and sophisticated weapons systems that 
might have been avoided, had the strategy not been espoused 
as the official U.S. policy.
III. FLEXIBLE OPTIONS AND DETERRENCE
The second, and perhaps the most important, concern 
is to determine what impact flexible options will have on 
strategic deterrence. As we have seen, the planned changes 
in the SIOP and the improvements in weapons systems do 
broaden the range of U.S. strategic forces. It might well 
be argued that if these changes increase flexibility and 
strengthen deterrence, this will offset their negative effect 
on the prospects for arms control. We already concluded 
that flexibility will be increased. The crucial question, 
then, is to consider whether or not the adoption of the 
changes will improve deterrence.
Any proposal for a change in nuclear strategy must meet
54three criteria. First, if the strategy is implemented, 
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the prospects that war will be less likely, will have to 
be enhanced. In other words, the change must not alter 
deterrence calculations in such a way that incentives for 
a first-strike will be increased. Yet, in spite of all 
precautions, a war might still break out. This calls for 
our second criterion: if the strategy is implemented, 
the prospects of controlling the level of destructiveness 
will have to be improved. And finally, if the strategy 
is implemented, the prospects of controlling escalation 
will have to be enhanced. It should be noted at the out­
set that even if these three criteria are analyzed sepa­
rately here, in practice they are often interdependent.
1. Credibility of Deterrence
Few, if any, of the critics of flexible options 
would deny the contention that the Soviet acquisition of 
an assured second-strike capability has seriously eroded 
the credibility of the American assured destruction threat: 
it would be hard to maintain that a limited Soviet probe, 
either nuclear or non-nuclear, would be followed by a 
massive U.S. revenge strike on Soviet cities, while leaving 
U.S. population centers exposed to a Soviet counterretal­
iation. The difference between those who oppose the concept 
of flexible options and those who stand in their favor, then, 
boils down to a debate over whether or not different ways 
of employing nuclear weapons can help strengthen deterrence.
Naturally, there are differences among the critics of 
the flexible options doctrine, but in general they tend to 
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see deterrence as deeply rooted in the physical fact of 
an assured second-strike capability, and therefore hardly 
amenable to changes either in weapons and doctrines for 
their employment.56 Lower level violence is considered 
possible, but it is maintained that limited conflicts 
should not disturb the balance at the strategic level. 
A logical consequence of these assumptions is that nu­
clear weapons are considered impotent as political tools: 
mutual fear of a nuclear confrontation keeps nuclear 
weapons from being used for coercive purposes. New weap­
ons systems are seen as unwelcome disturbances that might 
fuel arms races and disrupt the balance that has until 
now prevented an Armageddon. Since an initiation of nu­
clear war at any level would be considered suicidal, the 
critics of flexible options suggest that U.S. efforts 
and resources should be spent on assuring the stability 
of mutual deterrence by dispersing and concealing the
57 American retaliatory force and improving control over it.
Advocates of the flexible options policy also perceive 
the main strategic balance as lasting: neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union is capable of disarming the 
other in a first strike, nor are they expected to acquire
58 such a capability in the foreseeable future. But they 
attach a tremendous weight to political perceptions of 
strategic balance. Consequently they feel ill at ease about 
the codification of nuclear parity in the Moscow and Vladi­
vostok agreements. This discomfort is coupled with concern 
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over the new generation of Soviet missiles. The preponder­
ance of one side, they argue, may become a source of serious 
miscalculations. Also, lack of resolve by one may be ex­
ploited by the other. In these occasions, it is contended, 
nuclear weapons gain independent political utility and, 
therefore, flexible employment of weapons becomes a "contin­
uation of politics by nuclear means." And given the strict 
limitations on the efficacy of massive deterrence, the acqui­
sition and preservation of a flexible options capability 
constitutes a sine qua non for continued political utility 
of nuclear weapons.
In what ways do the proponents of the doctrine expect 
flexible employment of nuclear weapons to bolster deterrence? 
In FY 1975 Defense Report Secretary Schlesinger argued that 
"a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue attack on our strategic 
forces may well be the worst possible case that could occur, 
and therefore extremely useful as part of the force sizing 
process. But it may not be the only, or even the most likely,
59 contingency against which we should design our deterrent;” 
and the same proposition was put forward by Secretary Rumsfeld 
two years later.The advent of Soviet-American strategic 
parity has raised, in their minds, the prospect of two kinds 
of hypothetical contingencies.First, there is the danger 
that in a crisis the Soviets might be tempted to utilize 
their newly-acquired parity for political purposes. To wrest 
concessions from the U.S. or her allies they could use or 
threaten to use their nuclear weapons selectively, striking 
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at counterforce targets with minimal collateral damage while 
still holding U.S. cities hostage. If the U.S. possessed 
only weapons ill-suited for flexible strikes, so goes the 
argument, it would be "self-deterred," and the Soviets could 
"with relatively low risk attack the interior of the United
6 2States." Under these circumstances, by being able to 
retaliate in kind against Soviet military targets the U.S. 
would manage to deter the Soviets from contemplating aggres­
sion and gaining the political advantages they were after.
The second concern has been raised by the prospect 
of a Soviet initiated conventional military action or an 
establishment of Soviet military presence in some strate­
gically important area like Western Europe or the Middle
6 3East. With relatively weak conventional forces and 
with only massive nuclear attack plans available, the argu­
ment goes, the U.S. would be in a weak position to deter.
If, on the other hand, the U.S. possessed an ability to 
respond flexibly, she could either deter the aggression by 
threatening with reprisals, or she could actually carry 
out the threat if deterrence fails by tailoring a selective 
response that would unwaveringly signal the U.S. determination 
to oppose the Soviet move. A limited nuclear response would 
thus be a way of beckoning one's opponent to the bargaining 
table, and at the same time a technique of promising more 
serious repercussions, if the opponent did not come to terms.
Let us now attempt to evaluate whether or not a capa­
bility of employing nuclear weapons selectively in the above 
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contingencies improves deterrence, and to do that, we should 
take a look at the premises underlying the theory of strate­
gic deterrence. A distinguished strategic analyst has defined 
deterrence as an effort "to reduce the probability of enemy 
military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficiently likely 
prospect that he will suffer a net loss or lower net gain than
64would follow from his not attacking." The potential aggres­
sor, therefore, has to make his decision on whether to attack 
or not to attack on the basis of the "expectation calculus." 
That is, he has not only to evaluate how capable the deterror 
is to carry out the punitive threat but also to estimate the 
probability of the threatened action being resorted to.^5 
Since deterrence is the product of these two calculations, 
in order to keep the value of the deterrent from declining 
if the capability is curtailed, the credibility of the threat 
being carried out has to go up. Alternatively, if the threat 
becomes less credible, the capability to materialize the 
threat has to increase. Furthermore, for analytical purposes 
deterrence can be divided into two stages: deterrence ex ante 
and deterrence ex post. The former refers to the attempt to 
persuade the opponent to believe that if he attacked, the 
promised punishment would be delivered. The latter, on the 
other hand, conveys the intention to carry out the threat, 
in case the opponent decides that deterrence ex ante is so 
low that it can be challenged, and actually chooses to launch 
an attack.
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Analytically, the deterror's position can be illustrated 
in the following manner.^ Let us assume a world of two ad­
versaries, A and B, both of whom attach utilities to 'peace'- 
V and U ; to their own 'first strike'-Vc and ; and toP p fs fs
their 'second strike'-V and U . In addition, the adver- ss ss
saries make the following subjective estimations of the prob­
ability that their choice of 'peace' will encounter the 
opponent's choice of 'first strike' during a certain time 
period:
A's estimate of the probability that B will strike = q
A's estimate of the probability that B will not strike = 1-q
B's estimate of the probability that A will strike - p
B's estimate of the probability that A will not strike = 1-p
Now, we can calculate the value for deterrence. Under normal 
circumstances, the utility of peace exceeds the utility of 
first strike which in turn exceeds the utility of second strike, 
or V > Vf > V and U > U > U . In other words, one normally 
prefers peace but if war is imminent it is more advantageous 
to strike first than to be forced to absorb the consequences 
of the opponent's first strike. This is especially clear in 
a nuclear war. Let us now calculate the values that A would 
have. If A prefers to opt for 'peace,' he will get either the 
utility for 'peace' (V ) or he will be attacked in which case 
p
he still has the utility of 'second strike' (V ). A estimates s s
that the probability of B striking is q. Therefore, since he 
always has an option of striking second, he will get V with s s
a probability of q and V with a probability of 1-q. A can, 
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of course, choose to strike first, and since he himself 
makes the decision, he can make the probability of Vfg 
equivalent to 1. For deterrence to obtain, the value of 
'peace* must be higher than the value of 'first strike,* 
or
(l-q)V + qV > V- ' p ss' fs
In a similar fashion, we could determine the deter­
rence value for B, using his utilities and probabilities.
In light of the above discussion we can now compare 
the assured destruction doctrine with the Schlesinger 
proposal. When the deterrent credibility of the former 
is examined, it becomes obvious that whatever power of 
persuasion the doctrine has, derives from deterrence ex 
ante. A potential aggressor who probes to find out if 
the promised deterrent holds, plays with the probability 
that the punishment postulated by the doctrine will in 
fact be inflicted. And he knows that if it is delivered, 
it will be devastating. In our equation, the value for 
'second strike,* V , is very high, and since it is so s s
high, the probability that one is going to be attacked is 
low. Of course, as we have already pointed out, with stra­
tegic parity the credibility of deterrence ex ante of the 
assured destruction doctrine has deteriorated: a rational 
decision-maker would hardly react to a challenge by deliv­
ering a blow on cities, leaving his own population to the 
adversary's mercy. The proponents of the doctrine assert,
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however, that the gap between the two types of deterrence 
can be successfully narrowed by exploiting the opponent’s 
uncertainties: treaties, commitments and "plate-glass
windows"—like U.S. conventional troops in Europe—can be 
used to make the promised punishment more credible, "slip­
pery slopes" and acts of recklessness can be invoked to
6 7 stir doubts in him. Therefore, even though the credibility 
of a massive second-strike has decreased, the exploitation 
of the adversary's uncertainties combined with the possibility 
of high levels of damage has deprived the adversary of incen­
tives to strike first.
Instead of manipulating the uncertainties of deterrence 
ex ante, Schlesinger proposes to exploit the certainties of 
deterrence ex post. In his words, to be credible over the 
whole gamut of contingencies, "deterrence must rest on many 
options and a spectrum of capabilities to support these 
options... and a venturesome opponent must know that we have
6 8 all of these capabilities." In other words, a potential 
aggressor has to recognize that the U.S. has the capability 
to respond in kind, and the resolve to do so.
Let us now look at the contingencies depicted by the 
former Secretary of Defense and examine what impact the avail­
ability of flexible response options has on deterrence. The 
first of the contingencies describes a situation where the 
opponent has decided to cash in on his strategic power by 
threatening to use his accurate and low-yield nuclear weapons 
unless the U.S. acquiesced to his political demands. For 
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ins tance, let us presume that the Soviets have already 
hit some military targets either in Europe or in the U.S., 
and a moderate amount of collateral damage to population 
has been caused. If the U.S. does not bow to the demands 
and make sufficient concessions, there is an unmistakable 
promise of more damage to come.
No doubt the availability of flexible options improves 
deterrence here. Even though a fair amount of damage has 
been suffered, the fulfillment of the assured destruction 
ex ante pronouncements does not appear convincing. The 
threat to hit cities is much less credible than the threat 
to return the attack in kind. In our analytical equation, 
the increased credibility of second-strike will thus com­
pensate for the decreased physical punishment promised. 
It might affect the calculations of the adversary in a 
positive way by decreasing the value of q, and the aggres­
sion will never take place. Or if the adversary miscal­
culates our determination and attacks, flexible strikes 
against his counterforce targets can be used in two ways. 
First, they can be used to deliver punishment at minimum 
provocation and at minimum initial damage to counter the 
damage suffered from the opponent's attacks, and secondly, 
flexible strikes can be used to warn the aggressor of more 
strikes to come and thereby persuade him to negotiate. How­
ever, we should recognize that there are dangers involved 
even in the use of small-scale responses. It is impossible 
to objectively determine what constitutes a "fair" response,
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and collateral damage will probably be greater than antic­
ipated. Furthermore, a limited nuclear exchange puts a 
high premium on the coolheadedness of national leaders: 
popular sentiments might sway them to respond massively. 
With these caveats in mind, we conclude that in the first 
contingency the capability for flexible options is desir­
able: despite the disadvantages, it raises deterrence ex
post and at the same time offers at least a partial check 
on escalation.
In the first contingency, the Soviets are depicted 
as using or threatening to use their nuclear weapons to 
initiate a nuclear exchange in order to wrest political 
concessions from the United States and her allies. The 
second, and more interesting scenario involves a Soviet 
conventional thrust into a strategically important area. 
It is more interesting, because it offers a crucial litmus 
test for Schlesinger's claims. A Soviet conventional probe 
into Western Europe does not necessarily need to be a likely 
contingency, but it seems safe to assert that it is more 
likely than a premeditated nuclear attack either on the 
United States or on Europe. Therefore, if the availability 
of flexible options enhances deterrence, it should be parti­
cularly evident in this contingency.
For deterring conventional attacks, flexible options 
are seen to improve deterrence in two ways. First, it has 
been maintained that the use of flexible strikes would
physically deprive the adversary of his chances to reach
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his military objectives. Schlesinger has given one exam­
ple: "If... one were to go after their oil production
capacity... the removal of that capacity would have a 
crippling effect on the Soviet ability to wage war against 
Western Europe.The general object, then, would be to 
hit the adversary's supply lines and troop concentrations, 
and destroy his airfields, marshalling yards and oil 
fields to make it excessively costly for him to proceed. 
It is expected that the adversary will stop, and a status 
quo ante can be negotiated. Secondly, flexible options 
are expected to have a psychological effect on an adversary. 
They are allegedly needed to demonstrate one's determination 
not to let him venture out with impunity, and also to signal 
that one is willing to continue to escalate if needed.
It has been correctly pointed out that the ex ante 
deterrent sanction of the flexible options policy is the 
lowest officially propounded by a U.S. Secretary of Defense 
in the post World War era.7^ Since deterrence ultimately 
depends on convincing our adversary that we are capable of 
depriving him of his objective or that it will cost him too 
much to reach it, in a grave crisis the sanction may not 
deter. In the deterrence equation, a drastic decrease in 
the value of 'second-strike,' V , might actually induce a s s
considerable increase in q, the probability of an attack.
The ultimate value of the left side of the equation depends, 
of course, on our perceptions of how large the changes in 
V and q will be, but it is safe to say that with the amount s s 
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of promised punishment going down, there will be increased 
incentives to make probes. Let us consider a hypothetical 
situation where another crisis over Berlin, for example, 
has gravely aggravated Soviet-American relations. NATO 
and Warsaw Pact troops have been already alerted. Since 
the ex ante deterrent sanction is relatively low, a deter­
mined Soviet leader might calculate that the damage resulting 
from a U.S. flexible options strike will not be as bad as 
the continuation of an unfavorable status quo. Besides, in 
his calculations he can still play with the possibility 
that he would perform a quick fait accompli, and escape 
unscathed. Let us further assume that the hawks have pre­
vailed in the Kremlin, and an attack has been launched.
The initial Soviet thrust has swept NATO forward defenses 
aside, and fearing Western European casualties, the U.S.
is unwilling to use tactical nuclear weapons. In this 
situation, how credible is the flexible options deterrence 
ex post?
It is argued that a few missiles for demonstration 
would be enough to show U.S. resolve and commitment to 
Western Europe. Well-placed strikes deep in the enemy 
territory, aimed at military installations with a minimum 
amount of collateral damage are thought to be sufficient. 
But these demonstration strikes might not persuade a deter­
mined adversary to halt his advance. Therefore, to make 
the threat effective and stop the opponent's advance, 
fairly large strikes will have to be planned. Troops and 
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their support facilities will have to be destroyed, air­
fields, bridges and railroads will have to be incapacited. 
It will be impossible to estimate precisely how many weap­
ons would be needed, but it has been asserted that "because 
the primary goal is to threaten the enemy with unacceptable 
costs, even limited options will almost certainly involve 
more than one or two nuclear weapons and might involve hun-
71dreds." Ironically, the promise of perhaps hundreds of 
weapons does not sound very different from a mutual assured 
destruction threat. Assuming that the adversary is about 
to reach his objectives, he might still decide to advance, 
and the United States would have to decide on further 
escalation. And that decision will necessarily include 
the willingness to absorb possible Soviet counterforce 
strikes with their collateral damage.
The last point raises an excruciating dilemma for
U.S. decision-makers. An escalation will conceivably prompt 
quid pro quo limited strikes on U.S. targets. In that 
situation, the United States bargaining position would be 
extremely weak. As compared with the Soviet Union, the
U.S. population is much more urbanized and thus more vulner­
able. At the time 400 megaton equivalents were calculated 
to be needed to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet 
society, the corresponding figure for the United States was
72thought to be only 200. In 1970, for example, almost 
three-quarters of the U.S. population was classified as ur­
ban—the respective Soviet figure was 56%—and most of the 
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population was concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. 
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that the Soviets are 
still trailing the United States in warhead accuracies— 
the Soviet accuracies for land-based missiles are estimated 
to be around 1600-2300 feet and according to the Pentagon
74 even these figures might be somewhat optimistic —and
Soviet warheads carry higher yields than their U.S. counter­
parts. Therefore, for otherwise equal exchanges these factors 
alone would make the United States suffer relatively more 
damage. Finally, to further aggravate the dilemma, U.S. civil 
defense programs are almost totally neglected. In the Soviet 
Union, the situation is quite different. The Soviets are 
deploying extensive civil defense measures with the expenditure 
of a billion dollars a year—for the fiscal year 1977, the 
United States is allocating $77 million—and are able to carry
. 75out elaborate evacuation plans. For all these reasons, 
therefore, the United States is hardly in an ideal position to 
initiate a round of nuclear strikes that might draw nuclear 
fire upon herself.
In conclusion, there seems to be little that flexible 
options will do to strengthen deterrence. Understandably, the 
old assured destruction scenario is growing uncomfortably 
incredible in Western Europe: a Soviet conventional probe 
into Western Europe is unlikely to unleash U.S. strategic 
missiles on Kiev and Leningrad. Also understandably, West 
Germans in particular are less than enthusiastic about the 
prospect of a tactical nuclear exchange on German soil.
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But there is unfortunately little that the new doctrine 
will contribute toward allaying European fears. Many of 
the flexible options targets will be in Eastern Europe, 
outside the Soviet Union. Therefore, in a hypothetical 
Soviet move in central Europe the U.S. might willfully 
avoid hitting Soviet targets in order to create a fire­
break and keep some limit to the exchanges. This is parti­
cularly attractive in light of what we have just learned 
about the vulnerability of the U.S. to limited nuclear 
exchanges. Therefore, in the worst possible case for the 
Europeans, not only might the Soviets still decide to move 
on despite U.S. threats, but the heartlands of both the 
super-powers would be held as sanctuaries, and the demon­
strations of resolve would be carried out on European soil.
For the United States, flexible options offer little 
solace. An adoption of the flexible options strategy to 
support extended deterrence in Western Europe and other 
important areas will signal that the U.S. and her allies 
have an inferior conventional warfighting capability, and 
that any conventional encroachment by the adversary will 
risk the possibility of the United States eventually re­
sorting to nuclear weapons. The United States, therefore, 
has to be able to convey her willingness to bear massive 
costs if needed. Otherwise, the threat is not credible. 
And as we just saw, the United States is hardly in a posi­
tion to make that commitment.
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2. Collateral Damage
One of the criteria we set for a change in nuclear strat­
egy called for improved control over the level of destruc­
tiveness. The first task of deterrence policies is to prevent 
war from breaking out. But if that fails, their secondary 
objective is to limit casualties by providing incentives to 
cease hostilities. It could well be argued that since deter­
rence might always fail, it would be preferable to have a 
posture that would be somewhat less deterring as long as it 
would keep the number of casualties down to a minimum.
In FY 1977 Defense Report Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed 
that "we have now acquired the combinations and yield and 
accuracy that permit long-range delivery systems to strike 
at a wider range of targets, and to do so with relatively
7 6low collateral damage." Indeed, at first sight, flexible 
options scenarios appear reassuring. Instead of panicky 
leaders stampeding into spasms of retaliation on cities for 
a slightest provocation and thereby causing tens of millions 
of casualties and a virtual obliteration of their societies, 
rational decision-makers are directing relatively light 
attacks with surgical precision at carefully selected targets. 
The credibility of limited attacks, of course, depends on how 
low the "relatively low collateral damage" is thought to be. 
Indiscriminate attacks are calculated to cause more than 100
77million casualties on each side. Soon after his initial 
announcement, Schlesinger estimated that flexible options 
attacks would cause "casualties of 15,000, 20,000, 25,000— 
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a horrendous event but one far better than the alterna-
7 8tive." His critics, on the other hand claimed that it 
would be impossible to keep the number of casualties within 
reasonable limits. In any nuclear exchange, the effects
7 
not only of blast but also of radiation would kill millions.
The difficulty in assessing casualty estimates stems 
from the lack of real life references. In theory, it seems 
plausible to strike at selected targets far from population 
centers in such a way that the casualties inflicted would 
remain in the order of tens of thousands. However, to keep 
the casualties that low, limitations on weather conditions, 
height of burst, terrain, and employment of weapons are
8 0 extremely demanding; perhaps too demanding in practice.
Very soon after the initial announcement, Schlesinger him­
self modified his earlier figures. In his Congressional 
testimony he explained that according to the Department of 
Defense calculations in a "selective counterforce strike by 
the Soviet Union—in which the Soviets attack SSBN bases and 
SAC bases, as well as the ICBM silos—the casualties could 
be as high as, say 5 or 6 million. In an attack on the ICBMs 
alone, the casualties would run on the order of a million, 
and for SAC bases, the casualties would be less than that— 
on the order of 500,000.
But even after the revision, there are several problems 
with the Department of Defense numbers. In comparison to 
the Pentagon estimates, an Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) analysis puts possible urban casualties as 
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high as 50 million for an attack where two 1 megaton war-
8 2heads arrive at each Minuteman silo. It should be noted 
that this estimate does not include the SSBN and SAC bases, 
and omits rural casualties altogether. But even allowing 
that the ACDA estimate might be overly pessimistic, the 
huge difference between it and the calculations presented 
by the Pentagon remains.
The drastic difference in the two calculations is 
partly explained by the fact that it appears that the 
Department of Defense has this time based its estimates 
on the 'best case' assumptions: only one warhead per tar­
get, optimum height of burst, August winds, and maximum 
utilization of civil defense facilities. Any deviation 
from these stringent assumptions would tend to increase 
the number of casualties, but the last assumption is parti­
cularly puzzling, since, as we noted earlier in this paper, 
no effective civil defense programs in the U.S. have been 
designed, let alone deployed. It is difficult to calculate 
precisely how much fluctuation there would be in casualty 
estimates if less than ideal conditions obtained, but an 
illustrative example was offered in the Congressional hearings. 
In a hypothetical "light" attack on the Whiteman Air Force 
Base in the vicinity of Kansas City, Missouri, casualties would 
amount only to a few thousand if the attacker used great accu­
racy and favorable wind patterns, but if these stringent re­
strictions were not followed, casualties might skyrocket to
8 3one million. It is clear from this example, therefore, that 
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much of the success of flexible options in actual operations 
would depend on the opponent's capability of exchanging lim*- 
ited strikes and, in particular, on his willingness to do so.
That the initial Department of Defense assumptions were 
unrealistically low in order to make the flexible options 
doctrine more palatable for the public has been recently 
underscored by the Department itself. In another revision 
of the first estimates, the Pentagon has recently admitted 
that a "selective nuclear strike" at the ICBMs might cause
84from 3.5 to 22 million casualties. The revised figures 
have allegedly been obtained by assuming that the Soviets 
chose to burst their weapons on the surface instead of at 
an optimum height. Yet, some of the earlier discrepancies 
remain. For example, the Pentagon calculations are still 
based strictly on selective attacks on strategic weapons 
systems. It is fair to assume that just as the U.S. tar­
geting includes soft targets, these are also included in 
Soviet planning. Therefore, in a hypothetical nuclear 
attack, instead of pounding on concrete-wrapped ICBM silos 
in North Dakota, the Soviets might hit an important civilian 
airport, an army barrack, a few crucial bridges, or some 
soft command and control facilities on the Eastern seaboard. 
If they chose to use their weapons in that fashion, casual­
ties would obviously be still higher.
In conclusion, there is little evidence to support the 
assertion that deterrence will be enhanced by a threat to 
execute a flexible options strike. To make the strike credible 
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collateral damage should be kept extremely low. All avail­
able evidence suggests that under most circumstances the 
number of casualties would be unbearably high, and, there­
fore, dangers of escalation would lurk close.
3. Escalation Control
Let us assume, however, that flexible options strikes
have been launched. Does the availability of flexibility 
help to keep war within limits? In general, can nuclear 
wars be conducted as calculated exercises of "will and pur­
pose," or will they inevitably turn into orgies of pure 
violence? These questions address our third criterion, 
that of escalation control.
Advocates of flexible options clearly believe that a 
selective use of nuclear weapons will restrict not only the 
level but also the extent of violence, that it is possible 
to have an exchange of a few warheads without major esca­
lation. Schlesinger's arguments are worth quoting at length:
If we were to maintain continued communications 
with the Soviet leaders during the war, and if 
we were to describe precisely and meticulously 
the limited nature of our actions, including 
the desire to avoid attacking their urban indus­
trial base, that in spite of what one says 
historically in advance that everything must 
go all out, when the existential circumstances 
arise, political leaders on both sides will be 
under powerful pressure to continue to be 
sensible.85
This is the epitome of conventional wisdom in post-war stra­
tegic thinking: cool, calculating actors communicating 
rationally with each other, able and willing to listen to 
reason, ready to bargain, capable of striking a mutually 
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happy compromise. A wealth of historical examples from 
the last three decades should tell us that signals are 
either lost or misunderstood, a bargain for one might look 
like selling out for another, and even fast friends have
8 6 difficulties in understanding each other. And further­
more, even if we were not to embrace the idea of a sacro­
sanct threshold between conventional ammunitions and 
nuclear weapons, we would still have to reconcile with the 
fact that an introduction of nuclear weapons does constitute 
a crucial break with the past. In quantitative terms, even 
a limited use of nuclear weapons is capable of inflicting 
a tremendous amount of damage on the opponent, and quali­
tatively, radiation effects in particular set nuclear weap­
ons apart from conventional explosives.
An exchange of a few warheads, therefore, does not 
inescapably need to lead to a loosening of all restraints, 
but it does open up a Pandora's box. Can the rationality 
and coolheadedness of decision-makers on both sides—on 
which Schlesinger puts so high a premium—be taken for granted? 
Is there any way to measure how much collateral damage is 
"acceptable" to the opponent? How can we be sure that our 
adversary has the capability of monitoring and interpreting 
an attack as a limited one, and even more importantly, that 
he chooses to interpret it as such? And finally, does he 
have both the capability and the willingness to actually 
get entangled in exchanging limited nuclear strikes, or does 
he expect nuclear wars to be large-scale under any circumstances?
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There are no clear and easy answers to any of these 
questions. But perhaps we should keep one simple guide­
line in mind: since both parties to a nuclear conflict 
have an interest in finding some limit, the firebreak should 
be kept as obvious as possible. A distinguished analyst 
has argued that "if two sides must strike a 'bargain' with­
out explicit communication, the particular limit has to 
have some quality that distinguishes it from the continuum 
of possible alternatives; otherwise there is little basis 
for the confidence of each side that the other acknowledges
8 7the same limit." It is not obvious that a "limited, 
flexible use" of nuclear weapons can be readily distin- 
uished from more large-scale attacks. What kinds of tar­
gets are we allowed to hit, how many targets destroyed 
would still fall within limited war, how much collateral 
damage would be permissible? To insist that the use of nu­
clear weapons can be as readily limited at, say, fifty as 
at zero, or that "Hitler could have used just a little
8 8 gas," is in fact blurring one very important distinction. 
The distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons 
is clearer than the distinction between flexible options 
strikes and attacks on cities, so in order to find a mutual 
recognition of limits, that distinction should be strengthened 
rather than undermined. We conclude, therefore, that although 
flexible strikes need not irrevocably lead to escalation, they 
do introduce an element of uncertainty and unpredictabality 
to military calculations that makes escalation more probable, 
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and that is one more reason to refrain from employing the 
flexible options strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tenor of this paper has been critical. On bal­
ance, we should recognize that the flexible options stra­
tegy does offer several advantages. If either the U.S. 
or her allies have been attacked with nuclear weapons or 
are about to be subjected to nuclear blackmail, it is 
desirable for the U.S. to have flexibility in targeting 
plans. But it should be emphasized that this can be ob­
tained by a wider range of choices and options in the SIOP, 
without improvements in weapons systems themselves. Avail­
ability of flexible options may also have a sobering effect 
in other potential crisis situations. If both superpowers 
have a tacit understanding that one nuclear explosion does 
not necessarily imply unrestrained spasms of retaliation, 
the classical scenarios for an outbreak of strategic nuclear 
war—accidents, mechanical failures, leaders gone beserk— 
cease to appear disastrous.
However, negative aspects of the strategy seem to over­
ride the positive ones. A nuclear attack in cold blood on 
the U.S. or her allies is a very unlikely possibility—and 
in this most of the supporters of flexible options would 
readily concur. A more likely one is a conventional probe 
to an area where vital U.S. interests are seen to be at 
stake. Our analysis strongly suggests that under this cir­
cumstance flexible options fail to enhance deterrence. The 
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deterrent effect depends on the credibility of the promise 
to stop a conventional attack by using or threatening to 
use extremely accurate nuclear strikes. Yet, the deterror 
is placed in a curious dilemma: few might be too few and 
many too many. Is there an alternative to rattling nuclear 
sabers? One escape from the dilemma is to create a con­
ventional local deterrent. For many, this solution conjures 
up images of soaring defense expenditures and U.S. service­
men swarming in other continents. It has been long argued, 
however, that better planning and coordination alone among
8 9 the Western allies would build up an adequate NATO muscle. 
This argument is now greatly strengthened by the future 
prospects of precision-guided munitions (PGM) for Western 
strategy. The conventional option would not only enforce 
local deterrence, but it would be a sensible alternative 
to drawing retaliatory nuclear strikes on the U.S. popula­
tion.
We should also recognize that the introduction of 
flexible options fails to solve many of the fundamental 
uncertainties underlying the concept of strategic deterrence. 
First, added flexibility and increased control over the 
weapons by themselves are commendable, but flexibility in 
combination with pinpoint accuracies and higher yields does 
raise the specter of first-strike, no matter how many times 
we try to deny it. Secondly, we should not numb our senses 
to the gruesome consequences resulting from even limited 
nuclear strikes. The availability of flexible options does 
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not free the decision-maker of a cruel bind: what are the 
conditions under which the deployment of nuclear weapons 
should be ordered? Even in a situation where the targets 
are far from population centers, casualties will be high; 
it will be hard to agree on rules of reciprocityJ and the 
dangers of escalation will always be present. While the 
assured destruction doctrine appears to imprison the deci­
sion-maker in a predetermined course of action, even flex­
ible options fail to remove the agonies of decision-making. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the flexible options 
doctrine does not offer a solution to the dilemma of 
morality in the current theory of nuclear deterrence. The 
ultimate deterrence threat still remains in the ability 
to hurt hostage civilian populations, and a limited deploy­
ment of weapons fails to change that grisly fact.
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